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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
THORN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

*
*

*
vs.

*

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

Case No. 15647

*
*

Defendant and
Appellant.

*

* * * * * * *
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
THORN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.

* * * * * * *
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff and Respondent, Thorn Construction Company,
Inc.

(herein referred to as "Thorn"), is seeking additional

compensation from the Utah Department of Transportation (herein
referred to as "The State") under a highway construction contract, NS-184(1) and NR-302(1), Wanship southeasterly toward
Peoa and Rockport State Park access road, for extra expenses
incurred in connection with (1) a greater than 25% underrun in
the item of "borrow" and (2) a widening of the turning radii
at the location where the new access road meets the existing
roadway.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the trial of this matter, the Honorable Marcellus
K. Snow, sitting without jury, determined that $24,500.00 was
a reasonable amount to be awarded to Thorn for extra expenses
incurred in connection with the widening of the turning radii
and the borro'w underrun.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Thorn seeks af f irmance of the judgment of the lower
· t h e amoun t o f $24 , 500 · oo , together with interest thereon
court in
at the legal rate from and after October 15, 1974.
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
While Thorn does not necessarily disagree with
Appellant's statement of facts,

some of the State's purported

statements of fact are in reality conclusions of law and for
that reason are disputed.

Furthermore, Appellant has stated

facts which are immaterial to the issues of this action and
has failed to state facts which Thorn deems to be material.
For these reasons, Thorn respectfully submits the following
statements of material fact,

together with statements contra-

verting appellant's version of the facts.
On March 27, 197 3, Thorn entered into a construction
contract with the State covering a project known as NS-184(1)
and NR-302(1), Wanship southeasterly toward Peoa and Rockport
State Park Access Road (herein referred to as "the project").
The written agreement executed by the parties incorporated t~
Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction,
1970 edition,

(herein referred to as "Standard Specifications").:

The Standard Specifications govern such i terns as scope of work, r
control of work, control of material, prosecution and progress,
and measurement and payment.

Significant words and phrases

used in the Standard Specifications are defined in Section iro, '
wherein the term "engineer" is defined as "the state highway
engineer of the department, acting directly or through his
duly authorized representatives, who is responsible for engi·
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j

neering supervision of the construction".

The term "supple-

mental agreement" is defined as "a negotiated agreement constituting a modification of the originally executed contract and
covering work beyond its general scope".
The engineer's estimate, prepared by the State in
connection with the Wanship project, included a requirement
for 28,100 cubic yards of borrow material.

At the completion

of construction, it was determined that only 15,305 cubic
yards of borrow material had been removed, transported, and
placed by Thorn at various points along the project.

Because

the actual quantity of borrow constituted a decrease of more
than 25% in the quantity of a major contract item, Section
104.02 of the Standard Specifications became applicable.
Section 104.02 states in part that if demand is made in writing
by either party to the contract, a supplemental agreement will
be necessary before any alteration is made which involves
any one of the following:
* * *
(3) an increase or decrease of more
than 25% in the quantity of any major
contract item except "excavation for
structures" and "piles."

Section 104.02 further states that "* * *In the event of a
decrease, any adjustments in payment shall apply to the quantity
or quantities of work actually performed and that *

-3-

* * no

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

allowance shall be made in the supplemental agreement for
anticipated profits."

As previously pointed out, a "supple-

mental agreement" is defined as "a negotiated agreement constituting a modification of the originally executed contract
and covering work beyond its general scope."

(emphasis added)

Section 104.02 further gives the engineer. several
alternatives whenever a satisfactory supplemental agreement
cannot be negotiated:
"When it is determined by the
engineer that under the provisions of
this subsection, a supplemental agreement is justified and an agreement
satisfactory to both parties cannot
be made, the engineer may determine
an amount which he feels is fair and
equitable, and order the contractor
to proceed accordingly, or may order
the work performed on a force account
basis or cancel the work from the
contract."
When the parties attempted to negotiate a suppl~e~tl
agreement in connection with the borrow underrun, the state took
the position that Thorn was not entitled to any additional
compensation except overhead expense calculated on the amount
of the underrun (12,795 cubic yards) based upon a breakdown
of the i terns comprising Thorn's original bid for the item of
borrow ($1.20 per cubic yard).

In other words, the State

took the position that Thorn was entitled only to the amount
allocated to overhead ($ .14 per cubic yard) multiplied by the
amount of the underrun (12,795 dubic yards), which amounts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to $1,791.30.

(R. 185-186)

Thorn, on the other hand, took the position that
because of the greater

than 25% underrun, it was entitled

to negotiate a supplemental agreement based on the actual
costs incurred in connection with the borrow item, including
an overhead and profit factor for the borrow actually used
on the project (15,305 cubic yards), but not for the amount
of the underrun (12,795 cubic yards).

In other words, Thorn,

in its attempt to negotiate a supplemental agreement in
connection with the borrow underrun, did not feel bound by
its initial bid of $1.20 per cubic yard.

Moreover, the

evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Thorn's costs in
connection with the borrow item increased substantially
because the source of 'borrow material represented by Virgil
Mitchell, an employee of the State, to be acceptable was
later determined to be unacceptable, and Thorn was required
to transport the borrow material from an alternate source a
greater distance away from the project. (R. 38)
Interestingly, none of the witnesses who testified
at the trial could ever remember another instance where a
source of borrow material was found to be unacceptable.
Virgil ~1itchell testified, for example, that in his 24 years
experience witn the State he had never known of any other
situation except the instant case where a source of borrow
-5-
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was found to be unacceptable.

(R.

225, 226)

Grant Thorn

further testified that in his 40 years experience in the
highway construction business, he had never known of a
potential borrow site that turned out to be unacceptable.
(R. 39)
both

At the outset of the proceedings, counsel for

parti~s

argued their respective interpretations of

Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications, and the
Court concluded that Thorn could introduce evidence
bearing upon the actual costs of the borrow actually used
on the project (15,305 cubic yards).

(R. 33-35)

During the course of construction, it was determined by the State that the turning radii at the point where
the new access road meets the existing highway should be
widened.

The project engLneer, Edward Watson, instructed

Thorn's Vice President, Dennis D. Weir, to perform the work
necessary to widen the turning radii, although no specific
amount was initially agreed upon with respect to the extra
expenses which would be incurred in performing the work.
(R. 77-82; 277-278)

There was never any question that Mr.

Watson ordered Thorn to widen the turning radii or that
the State would pay the extra expenses incurred.

(R. 278)

A problem arose, however, when Thorn claimed an amount in
excess of that which the project engineer, Mr. Watson, felt
was reasonable.

(R.280)

On October 15, 1974, Thorn sent
-6-
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a letter to the State claiming $38,642.83 for extra
expenses incurred in connection with the borrow underrun and the widening of the turning radii, and also
requesting a supplemental agreement.

(R. 280)

Mr. Watson

did not agree with the amount claimed by Thorn and felt
he could not execute a supplemental agreement in the
amount of $38,642.83, and no supplemental agreement was
ever reached.

(R.

280)

Thorn commenced this action against the State
seeking to recover $38,642.83 for extra expenses incurred
in connection with the borrow underrun and in widening
the turning radii.

The trial court concluded that

$24,500.00 was a reasonable amount to be awarded to Thorn
in connection with these itmes, and on January 6, 1978,
judgment was entered against the State in the amount of
$24,500.00, together with interest thereon at the legal
rate from and after October 15, 1974.
The State subsequently filed this appeal,
seeking reversal of the judgment and entry of a judgment
in the amount of $1,791.30 or in the alternative, a new
trial.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
CONCLUDING THAT $24,500.00 WAS
A REASONABLE AMOUNT TO BE AWARDED
-7-
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TO THORN IN CONNECTION WITH THE
BORROW UNDERRUN AND WIDENING THE
TURNING RADII
The State has attempted in this appeal to
encroach upon the discretion of the trier of fact below
and essentially re-try the case on the merits.

With

respect to the scope of appellate review of discretionary
matters, the following statement is found in 5 Am Jur 2d
"Appeal and Error", Section 772 at page 215:
"The necessities of judicial
administration require the Courts
of first instance be vested with
a large measure of discretion in
passing upon various matters which
cannot, in their nature, be effectively reviewed on the cold record
transmitted to the appellate court.
Decisions reached in the proper
exercise of such discretion have
frequently been said not to be
within the proper scope of appellate
review, and it is clearly the ordinary practice of appellate courts
to refuse to review the exercise of
such discretion except for abuse."
And as this Court stated in Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d
1286 (Utah, 1976), "The judgment of the trial court will
not be reversed unless it is shown that the discretion
exercised therein has been abused."

552 P.2d at 1290.

The facts of the instant case are in many respects
identical to the case of Jack B. Parson Construction Compa'.1
vs. The State of Utah, 552 P. 2d 107
case, the plaintiff

(Utah, 1976).

In that

("Parson") sued the State in what was

-8-
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essentially an attempt to.renegotiate the entire contract
governing a highway construction project on Interstate 80
between Wendover and Knolls, Utah.

In Finding No. 28 of

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial
court found that the items of bituminous material, bituminous surface course, and rubber latex additive all underran in excess of 25% of the proposal quantities and that
Parson was entitled to a "supplemental agreement" in those
three areas under the provisions of Section 104.02 of the
Standard Specifications, the purpose of which was "* * * to
help Parson recover costs not otherwise recovered because
of the reduced quantity."
Finding No.

The Court further stated in

29 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law that "* * * the reasonable cost which it (Parson) is
entitled to recover as a result of the underrun in quantities
of bituminous items is $258,034.00."

Parson's total claim

was for $743,986.00.
The appeal of Parson apparently arose from a
finding of the trial court that there was a decrease of
less than 25% of the total cost of the work, calculated
from the original proposal quantities at the unit contract
prices.

The only issue appealed to this Court was whether

agreed upon deletions from the contract amounting to
$133,765.00 should be considered in calculating whether
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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there was a decrease of more than 25% of the total cost
of the work.

This Court construed Section 104.02(2) of

the Standard Specifications in favor of Parson, concluding
that there had in fact been a greater than 25% decrease
in the total cost of the work and that Parson was entitled
to an additional $116,664.00.
In reversing the decision of the lower Court,
this Court made the following statement with respect to
its interpretation of Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications:
"However, the language of the
specifications set forth reserves
to the State the right to make
changes in the quantities and
alter the details of construction
as may be found necessary or desirable.
Such changes may be made and apparently
were made during the performance of
this contract unilaterally. On the
other hand the supplemental agreement
is one which must be assented to by
both of the contracting parties.
In
making a determination of whether or
not there was an overrun or an underrun in a particular contract the
language of the above referred to
specification is controlling. The
language is clear and unambiguous
and states that the percentage must
be calculated from the original proposed quantities.
* * *We conclude
that the calculation of the final
contract price must be based on the
original proposal which does not
permit the state to deduct from the
original contract price the change
orders reducing the quantities.
To
-10-
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decide otherwise would permit
the state to greatly alter the
t~rms of the contract by the
simple device of issuing minus
or plus change orders. * * *
A substantial reduction in the
amount of work to be performed
would tend to increase this unit
cost and may in certain instances
compel him (the contractor) to
accept a loss he could not anticipate or guard against."
552 P.2d 108 (emphasis added)
The claim asserted by Thorn in the instant case
with respect to the borrow underrun is identical to the
claim asserted by Parson in connection with the bituminous
material, bituminous surface cour~e, and rubber latex
additive underruns.

Thorn claimed in the lower court, as

did Parson, that it was entitled to negotiate a supplemental
agreement to recover costs related to the work actually
performed and not otherwise recovered because of the reduced
quantities.

The damage exhibit used by Parson in connection

with the bituminous underruns included amounts for overhead
and profit related to work actually performed, not "anticipated profits" on the quantity of the underrun.

The trial

court accepted Parson's damage exhibit with the profit and
overhead factors included, and the State did not question
that finding on appeal, although it could have done so.
Likewise, in the instant case, Thorn attempted to
negotiate a supplemental agreement in connection with the
-11-
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borrow underrun which included a profit factor for the
borrow actually used on the project, and the trial court
accepted Thorn's construction of Section 104.02 of the
Standard Specifications.

To have done

otherwis~

would

have rendered meaninghless the definition of a supplemental
agreement, which states that such an agreement is a
"negotiated agreement constituting a modification of the
originally executed contract and covering work beyond
its general scope".

(emphasis added)

According to the

State's interpretation of a supplemental agreement in underrun situations, there is no negotiation necessary, as
evidenced by the following statement found on page 19 of
the State's brief:
"Past precedent within the Department
of Transportation has been to compensate the contractor for his fixed costs
and overhead which he would not otherwise recover because of the quantity of
the underrun.
* * *In theory then, it
is reasonable in an underrun to pay only
fixed costs and overhead."
The State is simply misconstruing the language of
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications, which states
that "in the case of decreased quantities of work, no allowance shall be made in the supplemental agreement for antic:!:.:
pated profits."

The State takes the arbitrary position

that in underrun situations, the contractor must submit a
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breakdown of its initial bid calculation and then accept
the amount allocated to overhead multiplied by the amount
of the underrun as payment for whatever expenses were
actually incurred in connection with the underrun.

The

State's theory flies in the face of this Court's statement
in Parson that "a substantial reduction in the apiount of
work to be performed would tend to increase this unit cost
and may in certain instances compel him (the contractor)
to accept a loss he could not anticipate or guard against."
552 P.2d 108.

Indeed, Section 104.02 also states that "in

the event of a decrease, any adjustments in payment shall
apply to the quantity or quantities of work actually performed."

(emphasis added)

The foregoing statement, coupled

with the language allowing the negotiation of a supplemental
agreement for decreases of more than 25% of a major contract item, clearly gives the contractor the right to
calculate his actual costs with respect to the quantity
of work actually performed, and negotiate from that basis.
The State somehow has the mistaken impression that the
damages awarded by the lower court in the instant case
included a profit factor connected with the amount of the
borrow underrun, but both Thorn and Parson calculated their
damages relative to the work actually performed, not the
anticipated work which was never performed.
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Thorn respectfully submits, therefore, that the
trial court was correct in its interpretation of Section
104.02 of the Standard Specifications, which governs the
negotiation of supplemental agreements.

Section 104.02

clearly states that in situations where there is a decrease
of more than 25% .in the quantity of a major contract item,
the adjustments in payment shall apply to the quantity or
quantities of work actually performed and that no allowance
will be made for anticipated profits.

The trial court

correctly concluded that the amount awarded to Thorn was
related to the costs of removing, transporting, and placing
15,305 cubic yards of borrow material at various points
along the project, and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE REPRESENTATIONS OF VIRGIL MITCHELL
CONCERNING THE UTELITE BORROW PIT WERE
BUT ONE FACTOR WHICH THE TRIAL COURT
CONSIDERED IN AWARDING DA..1\1.AGES, NOT
THE ENTIRE BASIS OF THE AWARD
One of the reasons for Thorn's increased costs
in connection with the borrow underrun was that the initial
source of borrow known as the Utelite Pit, represented by
Virgil Mitchell, a State employee, to be acceptable, was
later determined to be unacceptable.

In calculating its

initial bid price of $1.20 per cubic yard for borrow
-14-
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material, Thorn relied on the representations of Virgil
Mitchell to the effect that the Utelite Pit was an acceptable source of borrow.

While the State and Mr. Mitchell

attempted to absolve themselves of any responsibility in
connection with "positive" representations concerning
the Utelite Pit, certain facts support the conclusion of
the trial court that Thorn was entitled to rely on the
representations of Mr. Mitchell.

First, the items compris-

ing the cost factors in calculating a bid in connection
with borrow include royalties to the pit owner, removal
costs, and transportation costs.

It is axiomatic that

transportation costs increase proportional to the distance
the borrow material is hauled.

When the State informed

Thorn that the Utelite Pit was unacceptable as a source
of borrow, arrangements were made to use the Crandall Pit
located south of Peca, Utah, a considerably longer distance
from the project, as an alternate source.

Second, in the

trial court, both parties had opportunity to present
evidence relative to cost factors, and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that Thorn's
increased transportation costs resulting from Mr. Mitchell's
representations should be considered as a factor in the
ultimate amount of damages awarded.
In E. H. Morrill Company vs. The State of Cali-15-
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fornia, 59 Cal.Rptr. 479, 423 P.2d 551 (1967), the California Supreme Court held that a contractor is entitled
to rely on the representations of the State relative to
subsurface conditions where the State makes a positive
representation concerning such conditions.

The Court

stated:
"The responsibility of a governmental agency for positive representations it is deemed to have made through
defective plans and specifications is
not overcome by the general clauses
requiring the contractor to examine the
site, to check up the plans, and to
assume responsibility for the work.
(Cit. omitted)
Accordingly, the language in Section 4 requiring the bidder
to satisfy himself as to the character
of subsurface materials or obstacles to
be encountered cannot be relied upon
to overcome those representations as
to materials and obstacles which the
State positively affirms * * * not
to exist, and plaintiff was entitled
to rely and act thereon."
423 P.2d
at 554
In the instant case, the trial court, acting as
both the trier of fact and law, heard conflicting evidence
relative to the representations made by Mr. Mitchell.

Mr.

Mitchell testified, in self-serving fashion, that the only
representations he made to Thorn consisted of statements
that the Utelite Pit was a prospective source of borrow
material.

(R. 229)

Witnesses for Thorn, on the other hand,

testified that Mr. Mitchell represented that material
-16-
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from the Utelite Pit was available and could be used as
borrow on the project.

(R. 38-39; 55-56)

The trial

court, after having heard the evidence, concluded that
Mr. Mitchell made a positive representation to Thorn to
the effect that the material in the Utelite Pit was
available and could be used as borrow on the project.
The foregoing facts bring the instant case within
the purview of Morrill, supra.

Under the reasoning of

Morrill, language in the contract requiring the bidder to
satisfy himself as to the character of surface and subsurface materials or obstacles to be encountered cannot
be relied upon to overcome those representations as to
materials and obstacles which the State positively affirms.
423 P.2d at 554.

Similarly, the trial court in the instant

case correctly concluded that language in Sections 102.05
and 106.02 of the Standard Specifications, requiring the
contractor to examine the construction site and determine
the availability of materials, could not be relied upon by
the State to overcome the positive representations of Virgil
Mitchell that material from the Utelite Pit was available
and could be used as borrow on the project.
POINT III
BECAUSE THE PROJECT ENGINEER ORDERED
THE WIDENING OF THE TURNING RADII, AND
BECAUSE THE AMOUNT OF THE BORROW UNDER-17-
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RUN COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DETERMINED
UNTIL THE PROJECT HAD BEEN COMPLETED,
THORN EITHER COULD NOT HAVE GIVEN OR
WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE THE STATE
ADVANCE NOTICE OF ITS INTENDED CLAIMS
It is an undisputed fact that there was a greater
than 25% decrease in the quantity of borrow used on the
project and that Thorn could not possibly have determined
the underrun until the final quantities had been calculated.
It is also undisputed that Edward Watson, the project
engineer, ordered the work done and agreed to compensate
Thorn for extra expenses incurred in widening the turning
radii at the point where the new access road meets the
existing highway.

Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifica-

tions clearly gives Thorn the right to negotiate a supplemental agreement based upon its actual costs incurred for
work actually performed in placing 15,305 cubic yards of
borrow on the project.

And because Mr. Watson, the project

engineer, ordered Thorn to widen the turning radii, the
only material issue of fact to be resolved at the trial of
this matter was the reasonableness of the amounts to be
awarded to Thorn.

And because Section 104.02 of the Standard

Specifications authorizes the project engineer to "order
the work performed on a force account basis", any ambiguity
in the language must be construed against the State.
should be remembered, in addition, that like the trial

-18-
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It

court in Parson, the trial court in the instant case did
not award the full amount of Thorn's claim.
In its brief, the State relies heavily on section
105.17 of the Standard Specifications to assert that Thorn
is barred from recovering any damages because of its
alleged failure to comply with procedural requirements.
Section 105.17 states in part:
"If, in any case, where the contractor deems that additional compensation is due him for work or material
not clearly covered in the contract
or not ordered by the engineer as
extra work as defined herein, the
contractor shall notify the engineer
in writing of his intention to make
a claim for such additional compensation before he begins the work on
which he bases the claim." (emphasis
added)
With respect to the borrow underrun, the State admits in
its brief that it would have been impossible for Thorn to
have given notice of its claim before the final borrow
quantities had been calculated.

Where the underrun

exceeds 25%, as it did in the instant case, Section 104.02
clearly states that "* * * a supplemental agreement will
be necessary

* *

*"

On October 15, 1974, Thorn requested

a supplemental agreement in the amount of $38,642.83, and
the sole basis for Thorn's corrunencement of this action lies
in the fact that a satisfactory supplemental agreement
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could not be reached.
In summary, because

(1) the amount of the borrow

underrun could not have been determined until after the
work had been completed;

(2) the State misconstrued

Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications and was
willing to award only $1,791.30 for the borrow underrun;
and (3) the State ordered the work done but was unwilling
to compensate Thorn in any amount for extra expenses
incurred in widening the turning radii, the trial court
correctly concluded that Thorn either could not have given
or was not required to give the State advance notice of
its intended claims.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly held that (1) Thorn
was entitled to be awarded a reasonable amount in connection
with the work actually performed in removing, transporting,
and placing 15,306 cubic yards of borrow material on the
project;

(2) because the project engineer, Edward Watson,

ordered the work done, Thorn was entitled to be awarded
a reasonable amount for extra expenses incurred in connection
with widening the turning radii at the point where the new
access road meets the existing roadway;

(3) Thorn either

could not have given or was not required to give the State
advance notice of its intended claims; and

(4) the amount
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of $24,500.00 was a reasonable amount to be awarded for
these items under the circumstances.
The State has had its day in Court and, even
though dissatisfied with the results, cannot prevail in
its assertion that there was an abuse of discretion in
the court below.

Thorn respectfully submits, therefore,

that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, YOUNG & PAXTON

By:

~-IJ ~lit?'

Steven H. Stewart
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
220 South Second East, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent were served upon the Appellant by mailing
the same, postage prepaid, to Leland D. Ford, Assistant
Attorney General and Attorney for Appellant, 115 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 30th day of June, 1978.

~JJ.~
Steven H. Stewart
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